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A closer look at US corporate profits and cash flow (part 2) (updated with Q3 2015 results)

Posted on November 24th, 2015

Main takeaways:
  • Numbers below are for nonfinancial domestic corporate.
  • After tax profits are $953bn (+1.8% yoy).
  • Nonfinancial domestic corporate net cash flow has increased recently to $1.7tn (+2.4% yoy).
  • The profit measure more closely associated with S&P500 reported earnings ticked down in 3Q15, but is up by 5.6% since last year.


Charts below are for Nonfinancial Domestic Corporate sector -- the ones in "A closer look at US corporate profits and cash flow (updated with Q3 2015 results)" are for total US corporate sector.

Total nonfinancial domestic profits from current production currently at $1.3tn.

Below total nonfinancial domestic profits from current production after taxes.

Out of the $0.96tn $0.94tn in after tax profits, 60% 61.6% is dividends and 40% 38.4% ($390bn $358bn) is saved.

It is also possible to calculate cash flow -- which is undistributed profits puls depreciation less (net) transfers. It is a measure of internal funds available for investment.

The national accounts also provide a measure of profits after tax without IVA and CCAdj. This is the measure often used in comparisons with the S&P measures of reported earnings.





A closer look at US corporate profits and cash flow (updated with Q3 2015 results)

Posted on November 24th, 2015

Main takeaways:
  • After tax profits are roughly flat at $1.5tn (since 2012).
  • (Net) dividends paid to other sectors is close to its historical average (as a share of profits).
  • Corporate net cash flow has increased recently (from $2tn mid-2013 to $2.2tn).
  • The profit measure more closely associated with S&P500 reported earnings ticked down in 3Q15, but is up by 4% since last year.


Let's take a look at what is happening with US corporate profits. But before, allow for a brief digression on what is and what is not calculated in the US National Accounts statistics.

BEA's main measure of corporate profits is profits from current production. It provides a comprehensive and consistent economic measure of the income earned by all US corporations. It is unaffected by changes in tax laws, and it is adjusted for nonreported and misreported income.

Profits from current production is derived as the sum of (a) profits before tax ("book profits", based on tax-returns provided by the IRS; financial-accounting information is used for the most recent periods) , (b) inventory valuation adjustment (IVA), and (c) capital consumption adjustment (CCAdj).

IVA: gains or losses resulting from inventory withdrawals are not considered income from current production. The IVA converts business-accounting valuation of withdrawals from inventory to a current-cost basis by removing the capital gain or loss element that results from valuing these withdrawals at prices of earlier periods.

CCAdj: converts valuations of depreciation (based on tax code parameters) to valuations that are based on empirically based depreciation patterns, and convert the measures of depreciation to a current-cost basis by removing the capital gain or loss that arises from valuing the depreciation of fixed assets at the prices of earlier periods.

Profits from current production can be "national" (including net profits / transfers "originating in the rest of the world") and "domestic". The profits component of domestic income excludes the income earned abroad by US corporations and includes the income earned in the US by foreign residents.


From this digression I return with charts to illustrate the above mentioned components.

Total profits from current production currently at just above $2tn.

Below total profits from current production before and after taxes.

Out of the $1.5tn in after tax profits, 55% 57.5% is dividends and 45% 42.5% ($700bn $600bn) is saved.

It is also possible to calculate cash flow -- which is undistributed profits puls depreciation less (net) transfers. It is a measure of internal funds available for investment.

The national accounts also provide a measure of profits after tax without IVA and CCAdj. This is the measure often used in comparisons with the S&P measures of reported earnings. It ticked down in Q3 15 but the one-year trend is still up.





US GDP: follow-up on Q3 2015 result (GDP Plus @ 2.9% QoQ)

Posted on November 24th, 2015

Main takeaways:
  • Given recent concerns about seasonal adjustment and measurement problems, BEA has recommended looking at both GDP and GDI to infer the underlying state of the economy.
  • However, all the measures (GDP, GDI and GDP Plus) are currently showing a similar picture: an annual pace of growth just above 2%, slowing down from the 3% pace of late 2014.

The highlights of the second GDP release for 3Q15 are in the link:

As mentioned in the comment US GDP: BEA working to improve growth statistics, the statistics bureau is highlighting the usefulness of their estimate of Gross Domestic Income to get a better picture of the economy.

This approach is also taken by Aruoba, Diebold, Nalewaik, Schorfheide, and Song (ADNSS) and is called GDP Plus. The authors view GDP and GDI as noisy measures of the underlying latent true GDP. The latest report estimates GDP Plus at 2.9% in the third quarter (QoQ, saar) and 2.3% compared to last year.

See the charts below comparing GDP, GDP Plus and a equally weighted average of GDP and GDI (as recently started to be published by BEA). As an interesting side comment, the charts below show that the GDP Plus estimate slowed down ahead of the GDP estimate before the GFC.





US 3Q15 GDP (second release): revised up to 2.1% (from 1.5%); real GDI printed at a healthy 3.1% in the quarter and was revised up in Q2

Posted on November 24th, 2015

Main takeaways:
  • GDP is running above potential.
  • The good news is that GDI was revised up in Q2 (0.7% to 2.2%) and printed 3.1% in Q13 2015 and was revised up in Q2 (before revisions, GDI was running very weak -- a point which I mentioned as a concern last quarter).
  • The value of goods and services purchased by US residents is growing at 2.8%.
  • Fear of inventory overhang: too much ado... (details below).


Third quarter GDP was revised up by 0.6pp, close to market consensus.
As the table below highlights, the upward revision was mostly in inventories, partially offset by weaker net exports and services consumption.



US GDP increased 2.2% yoy in Q3; trend in the last 2 years is 2.5%

Domestic demand is growing at 2.8% yoy

The good news was that GDI was revised up; it appeared to be flat from Q4 2014 to Q2 2015 but that was revised away
Indeed, 2Q 15 GDI growth was revised up from 0.7% to 2.2% qoq and Q3 15 GDI initial print was 3.1% qoq.


The average of real GDP and real GDI increased 2.6 percent in the third quarter, compared with an increase of 3.0 percent (revised) in the second

Both GDP and GDI are growing at 2% yoy


Business value added slowed to 1.8% in Q3 15, but the overall 2.6% growth trend is unchanged

Inventories

There is a lot of concern regarding inventory accumulation in the US. JPM, for instance, wrote that
"The mix of growth, however, is now less favorable for Q4 GDP, as real final sales were revised down from 3.0% to 2.7%, while inventory building was revised up from a $57 billion pace to an unsustainably hot $90 billion rate. The bigger inventory overhang helps explain why manufacturing sentiment remains cautious early in the fourth quarter, and does present downside risk to our 2.5% estimate for current-quarter GDP growth."

There are indeed reasons to be concerned about short-term quarter-on-quarter growth outcomes. I have looked at inventory-to-sales ratio in manufacturing, wholesale and retail sectors, and the big jump observed from late 2014 into 2015 in all the sectors seem to be mostly related to the energy sector. Of course there are sectors in which inventory level is too high and will need to be adjusted. Clothing is an example. But I think that translating that concern into a big worry for the US economy may not be appropriate.

Let's take a look at the total economy.
The chart below shows that inventory accumulation in the Q3 2015 was 0.6% of final sales, which is elevated by historical standards (at least when comparing to the period of the great moderation).

So it may be the case that the pace of inventory accumulation slows down in the coming quarters. Since it's the change in inventory accumulation that impacts growth, it might be the case that inventories remain a drag to growth in the coming quarters. Indeed, the slowdown of inventory accumulation in the third quarter was already enough to subtract 0.6pp from growth (better than the initially reported drag of 1.4pp). If the current flow of inventory accumulation goes to zero over a one-year period, this would result in a drag of 0.8pp to GDP growth.

However, the actual level of inventories (as opposed to the pace of inventory accumulation) does not seem particularly high. The ratio of inventories to final sales (nonfarm inventories) did increase from 2.14 at the end of 2014 to 2.18 in Q3 2015, but the overall picture seems to be of a flat inventory to final sales ratio in the aftermath of the financial crisis.


A constant inventory-to-sales ratio at 2.18 would imply inventory accumulation of around $60bn, not very far from annualized pace of inventory accumulation observed in Q3 ($90bn). An adjustment to $60bn pace of inventory accumulation over a year would result in a small inventory drag to GDP growth of around 0.2pp over the same period.

US Retail Inventories -- measurement error?

Posted on November 23rd, 2015

US Retail Inventories

There is a growing concern regarding the recent increase of inventories in the US economy, including in the retail sector. A recent article in the WSJ illustrates that: Retailers’ Full Shelves May Force Holiday Discounts.

Main takeaways

  • Inventory/Sales ratio in the retail sector is increasing since 2012 and jumped substantially since late 2014.
  • Inventories are reported monthly for kind of business representing 80% of the total inventories in the sector.
  • Among these business, there is no common trend in the I/S ratio.
  • Consolidating all those business categories shows a stable I/S ratio in the aftermath of the recession and a minor jump by early 2015.
  • So the uptrend (and jump in 2015) in I/S ratio is due to “others" – business for which the US Census Bureau does not report monthly breakdown on inventories.
  • Looking at the breakdown of sales in the “other" business, one can infer that lower gasoline sales (lower prices) are behind the drop in overall “other" sales.
  • Meanwhile, the US Census Bureau estimates show “other" inventories growing at the same pace as overall inventories – this seems to be an error that is causing the I/S ratio for “other" business to increase materially and affect the shape of the overall I/S ratio that everyone is concerned about.

The bottom line is that the increase in I/S ratio in the retail sector is likely caused by an error in estimating gasoline inventories.

Facts

There’s not much information available on retail inventories. The annual survey breaks down total retail inventories in 12 groups and the monthly survey brings information on just 6 groups that account for around 80% of the total retail inventories.
Total retail sales (excluding food services) was USD 395bn in September/15 (seasonally adjusted). This is equivalent to a pace of annual retail sales of USD 4.7tn (26% of GDP). Retail inventories were USD 584bn in Sep/15 (seasonally adjusted), representing around 1.5 months of sales.

The chart below plots the monthly seasonally adjusted inventories/sales ratio since Jan/1992.

The chart shows that I/S ratio first reached a low of 1.34 months on Oct/2011 and has since increased to 1.48 months (Sep/2015).
It is difficult to square the uptrend in I/S ratio observed since Oct/2011 with the comments in the WSJ report, which only mentions the most recent few months as a reason for concern. It could be the case that the initial build up on I/S ratio was a healthy adjustment in the aftermath of the crisis, but the recent pick up in inventories was an error… however this also does not match the fact that retail sales growth (excluding gasoline) continues in a healthy trend – see US Retail Sales – trend remains unchanged (Oct/2015).

Breakdown of I/S ratio

Total retail inventories are split into the following kind of business:

  • motor vehicle and parts dealers (33%)
  • general merchandise stores (15%)
  • building materials (9%)
  • clothing (9%)
  • food and beverages (8%)
  • furniture,electronics and appliances (5%)
  • others (21%)

Motor vehicle and parts dealers alone account for about one-third of the retail inventories, but the chart below shows that the increase in inventories/sales is not related to the auto sector (indeed, I/S for the motor vehicle sector has been sideways).

Motor vehicle and parts dealers

General merchandise stores

Building materials, garden equip. and supplies dealers

Clothing and clothing access. stores

Food and beverage stores

Furniture, home furn, electronics, and appliance stores

Others

The remaining category “others" is calculated by residual since its breakdown is not available in the monthly data. The “other" group includes health and personal care; gasoline stations; sporting goods, hobby, book and musical instrument; miscellaneous retailers; nonstore retailers (mail order, online).

Additional comments

One can see that increasing inventories in clothing stores and “others" seem to be behind the overall increase in I/S ratio. Unfortunately, there’s no individual kind of business that dominates the “others" inventories. Based on annual data, “others" inventories are split in:

  • nonstore retailers (30%)
  • health and personal care stores (30%)
  • sporting goods, hobby, and music instrument stores (17%)
  • miscellaneous store (14%)
  • gasoline stations (10%)
The chart below plots the I/S ratio for total retail sales excluding motor vehicles and “others". One can see that there was an increase in I/S ratio from late 2014 early 2015 but there is stability in recent months. Moreover, the increase in I/S ratio is materially less pronounced than what is observed in the total I/S ratio (see first chart at the top).

The next chart plots the sales of the “other" categories relative to the total retail sales excluding “other" and vehicles.

The next chart plots the inventories of the “other" categories relative to the total inventories excluding “other" and vehicles.

The charts above illustrate several interesting economic shifts. For instance, the downtrend in I/S ratio of the “other" categories from 2000 to 2008 was led by a faster increase in sales of the “other" categories relative to total sales. This is very likely the result of increasing e-commerce. Indeed, the share of nonstore retailers' sales in the “other" category increased steadily from 25% in 2000 to 38% in 2014.

But for the purpose of understanding why I/S ratio in the “other" categories jumped in late 2014, we need to look further.

The chart below excludes gasoline sales (gas stations and fuel dealers) from the “other" category and plots its sales relative to total sales excluding vehicles and “other". The result? “Other" sales are booming!

The charts above show that “other" inventories are increasing at the same pace of overall inventories but “other" sales collapsed. We learned that the collapse in “other" sales is due to gasoline sales – indeed, “other" sales excluding gasoline are increasing faster than the remaining sales. Unfortunately, the US Census Bureau does not measure monthly gasoline inventories (it is only measured annually) and it seems that they are failing to account for the drop in gasoline inventories as measured in current dollars – since there is no reason to believe that the volume of gasoline inventories has increased substantially in the retail sector to offset the fall in gasoline prices.

Conclusion

The overall tentative conclusion from the charts above is that gasoline inventories are mismeasured and, therefore, are distorting the overall inventory/sales ratio in the retail sector.


Dr. Paulo Gustavo Grahl, CFA (2015-11-23)



FOMC minutes: getting ready for a 'dovish hike'

Posted on November 18th, 2015

Minutes from the October meeting hint at an FOMC that is aiming at a dovish hike in December.

Dovish because: (a) it seems likely that they will emphasize the low equilibrium real rates as a reason for "keeping the target federal funds rate below the levels the Committee views as normal in the longer run" even after full employment and 2% inflation, and (b) it appears likely that a message will be sent that the Fed will not run out of ammunition and it would be ready to reverse course if economy unexpectedly weakens (perhaps "unconventional" policies will become "conventional"?).

The point (b) above is important because it might be what is needed for the 'doves' to be on board for voting for a hike next month.


Main takeaways from the Committee:
  • Decision to be on hold explained:
    • Almost all members agreed it was appropriate to wait for additional information to clarify whether the recent deceleration in the pace of progress in the labor market was transitory or reflected more persistent factors (note: the October report, released after the meeting, was probably enough to conclude deceleration was transitory).
    • Also, in the absence of greater confidence about the inflation outlook, it would be prudent to wait for additional information.
  • How much further progress in labor market is needed?
    • Members expressed a range of views regarding the extent of further progress in labor market indicators they would need to see to judge it appropriate to raise the target range for the fed funds in December.
  • How much progress toward 2 percent inflation?
    • The same bla bla that members anticipate inflation would gradually return to 2% over the medium term.
    • But minutes mentioned that most of the members were not yet sufficiently confident of that to begin increasing rates.
    • A couple of members expressed concern about the continued decline in market-based measures of inflation compensation. "Moreover, the risk was noted that downward pressures on inflation from the appreciation of the dollar could persist".
    • The October CPI report, however, has shown all the measures of core inflation rising (see http://bit.ly/USOctCPI).
  • Changes to postmeeting statement:
    • FOMC changed its near-term policy path from the assessment that would be needed to determine "how long to maintain the current target range" to what would be needed to determine "whether it would be appropriate to raise the target range at its next meeting".
    • The idea was to convey the information that rates would be increased IF: (a) unanticipated shocks do not adversely affect economic outlook, and (b) incoming data support expectation labor market will continue to improve and inflation will return to 2%.
    • So the goal was to leave policy options open for December; but a couple of members worried this could be signaling too strongly that rates would be increased in December.


Discussion on equilibrium real rates (r*)
  • The staff briefed the participants regarding the concept of an equilibrium real interest rate (r*).
  • Conclusions leaned towards:
    • r* was negative in the aftermath of the 2008-09 financial crisis and is currently close to zero.
    • Equilibrium level of r* would likely remain low relative to estimates before the financial crisis (due to productivity and demographic factors).
  • Policymakers made a number of observations:
    • actual levels of short-term real rate has been below r* (but not substantially below), consistently with estimates that r* is currently close to zero.
    • a number of participants expect r* to rise as the expansion continues (but probably only gradually).
    • r* will not go back to pre-crisis levels (this is why the dot for long run nominal fed funds has been falling in Fed's forecasts).
    • Lower r* imply rates will be closer to the ZLB --- and this "might increase the frequency of episodes in which policymakers would not be able to reduce the federal funds rate enough".
    • Therefore "some participants noted that it would be prudent to have additional policy tools that could be used in such situations".

According to the Taylor rule mentioned by Yellen on her remarks earlier this year, even considering r*=0 (the green line in the chart below) the Fed would already be behind the schedule. An r*=0 (and current readings on PCE inflation and unemployment rate) would imply fed funds at 0.75% in Sept/15 and 1% by December (based on Fed's forecasts).

This might be what Fischer had in mind when he mentioned last week that monetary policy has already responded to the dollar appreciation and foreign weakness "through deferring liftoff relative to what was expected".



Participants' Views:
  • There was a lot of talk about the labor market in the aftermath of a slowdown in job gains in August and September, and the discussion centered on whether it was temporary or more persistent. Hawks and doves made the usual arguments.
  • There was somewhat widespread concern with downside risks to inflation (mentioning market-based measures of inflation compensation).
  • Arguments against delaying increasing rates were presented: delay could increase uncertainty in financial markets, unduly magnify the importance of the beginning of policy normalization, increasing risk of a buildup of financial imbalances, decision to delay could be interpreted as signaling lack of confidence in the US economy, could erode FOMC credibility, progress should be measured in light of the cumulative gains without placing excessive weight on month-to-month changes in incoming data.
  • Arguments for delaying were also presented: downside risks to the outlook remained, concerns about loss of momentum in the economy, that inflation might fail to increase, uncertainty about whether growth was robust enough to withstand potential adverse shocks given limited ability of monetary policy to offset such shocks, concern that beginning of normalization might be associated with unwarranted tightening of financial conditions -- risk management considerations would call for caution, premature tightening might damage FOMC credibility to reach 2% inflation.
  • From the size of the previous two bullets, one may infer the arguments are balanced.
  • But the more important, perhaps, was that "several participants" think it would be prudent to consider options for providing additional policy accommodation if the economic outlook were to weaken and undermine progress in labor market conditions and reaching 2% inflation.


US Inflation: Are we there yet? Yep (Oct/2015)

Posted on November 17th, 2015

Main takeaway:
  • Core CPI inflation momentum rose to 2.2% (annualized). The last two months hit 2.7% (ar).
  • Core services inflation increased from 2.5% yoy in June to 2.8% yoy in October. Core goods are down 0.7% yoy.
  • Sticky-price CPI (a sign of anchored expectations) is trending up.
  • Is that enough to be reasonably confident inflation will move back to its 2% objective?

Fed's criteria for raising rates:

"The Committee anticipates that it will be appropriate to raise the target range for the federal funds rate when it has seen further improvement in the labor market and is reasonably confident that inflation will move back to its 2 percent objective over the medium term."

So Fed needs to be reasonably confident inflation will move back to 2%. Are we there yet?

A month ago, Fed comments suggested the Fed was getting increasingly worried about downside risks to inflation (due to oil prices, strong dollar, slowdown in economic data). More recently, the message was more upbeat and a few Fed speakers even mentioned the keyword -- saying they were getting confident inflation would converge to target.

Today's CPI print showed an increase in core inflation momentum (3-month annualized inflation) and thus should increase Fed's confidence. Core inflation momentum moved from 2% to 2.2% -- but the annualized inflation in the last two months is an even higher 2.7%:

Average YoY measure of core inflation is currently at 2.1% -- the most recent low was 1.8% in May, but overall core inflation has been stable at around 2% since mid-2012.

But behind the stability in YoY core inflation there's a growing divergence. Core goods are 0.7% lower than a year ago and core services are 2.8% higher. Note how the pace of increase in core services prices increased in the last few months! It is very close to the average 3% inflation observed during 2002-2008 period.

Housing prices (rental and OER) represents 33% of CPI and is increasing at 3.2% yoy.


Sticky-Price CPI (a sign of anchored expectations) is trending up

The Atlanta Fed produces a breakdown between 'sticky' vs 'flexible' prices and they argue 'sticky' prices (which is a weighted basket of items that change prices relatively slowly) "appear to incorporate expectations about future inflation to a greater degree than flexible prices".




Overall prices, outside of energy group, do not seem to have bent to low oil prices and strong dollar.


Market-based inflation expectations and compensation

US Retail Sales -- trend remains unchanged (Oct/2015)

Posted on November 13th, 2015

Main takeaways:
  • October: advance retail sales rose 0.1%mom, below 0.3% market consensus; control group increased 0.2%mom vs 0.4% consensus.
  • Despite being below consensus, trend growth is unchanged:
    • 12-month growth of total retail sales ex gasoline stations increased from 4.2% to 4.3%.
    • 12-month growth of the 'control group' unchanged at 3.1%.
    • Both are very close to the 4-year growth pace: a resilient consumer!
  • Inventory-to-sales ratio remained stable.

Despite the weaker than expected monthly figures, the overall trend for retail sales remains unchanged. Total retail sales are flat in the last three months, but excluding sales at gas stations the trend growth is healthy: 4.3% in the last year compared to 4.5% in the last 4 years (in nominal terms).

The chart below compares total retail sales with retail excluding gasoline sales. It is clear that most of the slowdown in retail sales earlier in the year and the recent flattening were due to falling gasoline prices.

Looking at the "control group" (total retail excluding auto dealers, bldg materials, gas stations) a similar growth picture emerges: 3.1% growth in the last year and 3.0% in the last 4 years.

Revisions to the previous two months were a small positive.

Excluding residual sales of gasoline from the control group reveals a 1pp growth gap.


Inventories: stable if one excludes gasoline sales (latest: September)




Extra charts

The charts below show retail and food services by kind of business. The red line is an index in log (averages zero in the period) so that a number 10 in the scale means sales are 10% higher than the period average. The red dashed line is the trend in the last 12 months and the blue bars (right scale) are the monthly percentage change. The headline is how the slope of the red dashed line has changed compared to last two months.


Last 12 months trend moved from 6.1% (Aug) to 6.7%


Last 12 months trend moved from 5.0% (Aug) to 5.5%


Last 12 months trend from -4.6% (Aug) to -3.8%


Last 12 months trend moved from 1.7% (Aug) to 3.4%


Last 12 months trend moved from 2.7% (Aug) to 1.9%


Last 12 months trend moved from 3.4% (Aug) to 4.0%


Last 12 months trend moved from -19.2% (Aug) to -14.2%


Last 12 months trend moved from 3.6% (Aug) to 2.6%



Last 12 months trend moved from 5.6% (Aug) to 6.0%


Last 12 months trend from 0.8% (Aug) to 2.0%


Last 12 months trend moved from 4.8% (Aug) to 3.9%


Last 12 months trend moved from 6.7% (Aug) to 6.7%


Last 12 months trend from 7.4% (Aug) to 5.6%

Global industrial trends

Posted on November 6th, 2015

Main takeaways:
  • Global PMI continues ticked up in both developed and emerging countries.
  • But there is a clear divergence on what the PMIs suggest:
    • Developed countries industrial production growth likely to move sideways at a low pace of growth
    • Emerging countries IP growth likely to slowdown further.


Global PMI ticked up in October...

... and it was an across the board increase; but emerging markets continue to under-perform its developed peers.

This suggests industrial production in developed economies should continue to grow at just above 1%...

...while industrial production growth in EM economies should slowdown further in the coming months.

And within emerging countries, the slowdown in industrial activity is driven by Asia (China), but it rebounded a bit in October.

The EM and DM PMIs suggest a convergence of growth between the regions is likely to continue...

... and as a result global industrial production growth is likely to slowdown. The chart below shows that world industrial production is usually cyclical -- except in the unusual expansion period between Dec/2001 and Feb/2008 and in the last 4 years up to mid-2014.

The previous slowdown / contraction periods (Dec/94 to Dec/95, Oct/97 to Oct/98, Aug/2000 to Dec/01, Feb/08 to Mar/09) were all period of crisis (Mexico, Asia, Nasdaq, and the GFR) and lasted about one year. The current slowdown is shallower but is also about one year old.




US October Payroll: Phew!

Posted on November 6th, 2015

Main takeaways:

  • Very strong report, across the board; 268k jobs were created in the private sector, and Aug/Sep job gains were revised up by 56k.
  • Weak job creation in August / September raised concerns about the health of the economy, but the October report seems to confirm my take that labor market was not as weak as portrayed by the previous two reports (see US labor market conditions suggest job creation higher than observed in Aug/Sep).
  • The pickup in wage growth (0.4% mom and 2.5% yoy) may be a reminder that the Phillips Curve is not dead.
  • Measures of labor slack kept shrinking, particularly those measures Yellen likes to focus (e.g., part time for economic reasons, marginally attached,...).
  • Particularly worrying is the decline in labor force participation (LFPR), which seems to be heading down after a brief respite.
  • If LFPR remains flat a mere 135k/month payroll for the next 14 months is needed to reach the 2016 median unemployment forecast.
    • Job growth above 135k/month or falling labor force will result in unemployment rate undershooting Fed's forecasts.
  • If employment growth slows from the current 2.3% to 1.5% yoy and LFPR remains constant (against structural trend), then unemployment rate would reach 4.4% by the end of 2016.
  • Allowing the LFPR to continue its down trend since 2010, 135k/month would lead unemployment rate to 4.0% by the end of 2016!
  • As for the timing of liftoff... last month I wrote: "Since I believe the payroll slowdown is temporary and that global risks are likely to recede in the coming months, I think December is still the most likely date for moving out of the ZLB". That remains the case since the October report confirmed my previous beliefs.

Establishment report:

Private payroll increased 268k in October, well above the bloomberg consensus. Net revisions were positive 56k.

The table below shows the expected range for private payroll (excluding outliers), the monthly surprise and revisions to the last 3 months. The actual print is in "red" (an "x" when inside the expected range and a box when outside).

It is interesting to see the shape of the gray area! The negative surprises in August and September led to a material downward change in market's expected range for private payroll.


Market has been on track forecasting the pace of job creation in the last 6 months!
One can see that the average of the median expectations for the last 12 months was 215k/month, very close to the actual releases of 223k/month in the same period (after revisions, private payroll averaged 226k/month in the last 12 months).

In the last 6 months the median expectations averaged 205k/months and the actual release averaged 204k (201k/month after revisions).

In the last 3 months the median expectations averaged 190k/m and the actual release averaged 175k/month (181k/month after revisions).

Payroll trend
The trend in private payroll (measured by the 12-month moving average) moved up to 226k/month from 217k/month (unrevised) in September. The chart below shows the current vintage (orange line) as well as the real time path observed in each of the last few months.

It is clear that the pace of job creation has slowed from the excessively high pace observed in Q4 2014 and Q1 2015.


The chart below shows that annual growth rate in private payroll is growing at 2.3% yoy -- off the highs but is still a healthy pace of growth.


The current yoy growth (2.3%) continues very close to the growth observed in private payroll in the last 3 years, which is above the peak observed in March/2006 during the previous expansion period and is closer to the growth rate observed in the late 1990´s.

Labor input:

The volume of total hours worked in the economy increased in October recovering from September drop and seems to be back on the trend ince 2009. Total hours worked increased 1.8% (annualized) in the last 3 months (blue line in the chart below).


The recovery in hours worked was mostly due to the goods sector. But it is probably too soon for manufacturing and mining jobs and hours to rebound substantially in the coming months.
Hours worked in the services sectors continued performing well.



Wages:

Wages (average hourly earnings) increased In October.
Wages for all employees rose by 2.45% yoy (vs 2.2% in September) and for production worker rose 2.2% yoy (vs 1.9% in September). Overall, as the chart below shows, average hourly earnings have consistently grown at about 2.1% p.a in the last three years.


Household income:

Good. Close to the trend observed in the last three years.


Goods sector nominal income rebounded.

Services sector income also back to a healthy trend.


Household report:

The labor force participation rate moved 'sharply' down in September to 62.4% and remained at the same level in October, breaking what had appeared to be a stable level. It is interesting to highlight that the most LFPR managed to do was to stabilize in 2014 -- a year in which job creation and labor market conditions improved quite substantially. If the LFPR resumes its structural downtrend it could put the Fed in a position where they see labor slack shrinking faster than what they forecast, despite a similar economic growth outlook.

The broader measure of unemployment (U-6), which includes marginally attached, discouraged workers, and employed part time for economic reasons is falling faster than the headline unemployment.

The median forecast for unemployment rate in the Fed's SEP (Summary of Economic Projections) is 4.8% for 2016, 2017 and 2018. Assuming a flat LFPR, a forecast of 4.8% unemployment rate by the end of 2016 is compatible with average employment growth of 135k/month, substantially lower than the current pace of job growth.


As a reference, even a slowdown in employment growth from 2.3% currently to 1.5% yoy (the floor observed since mid-2011 was 1.8% yoy) would be equivalent to monthly employment gains of 178k and this would lead to a 4.4% unemployment rate by the end of 2016. Bottom line: LFPR needs to rebound (or job creation to settle at a very low level) for a 4.8% unemployment forecast to be attainable.

See detailed charts below:




The chart below shows unemployment rate (and short-term unemployment) and the recent tightening cycles (yellow). The short-term unemployment rate is at the lows.

Long term unemployment rate is improving faster. Moreover, the 'shadow' labor (i.e., the gap between U-6 and the headline unemployment rate) is also improving faster in the recent months. This is a clear sign that the labor market continues improving.





















Paulo Gustavo Grahl, CFA

Random comments on macro data. Views are my own. Except when they aren't.